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BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
Rosalie Wacker O'Brien*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article reviews recent developments in the law affecting
Virginia businesses and corporations. Part II discusses judicial decisions, including: a United States Supreme Court decision concerning private rights of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;1 a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
opinion denying absolute priority to the FDIC as liquidator;2 two
decisions interpreting the Virginia Stock Corporation Act, one by
the Fourth Circuit denying the protection of the good faith standard to directors 3 and one by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia refusing to characterize a failed
LBO/cash merger as an unlawful distribution; 4 two Supreme Court
of Virginia decisions regarding closely-held corporations, one returning control of a corporation from a son to his father by applying principles of gift law5 and one ordering the dissolution of a6
profitable corporation due to oppression of minority shareholders;
a group of three cases in which the Fourth Circuit and two Virginia
circuit courts determined whether one can recover from a successor
for corporate liability;7 and several rulings that challenge conven-

tion, including a Western District decision that one of four family
shareholders can bring a derivative action against the other three,"
a Western District ruling that a bank could be a seller under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 9 and a Fourth Circuit holding that a series of actions taken in pursuit of a freezeout stated a
* Associate, Rilee, Cantor & Russell, Richmond, Virginia; B.S., 1981, University of Illinois; J.D., 1987, Northwestern University.
1. See infra notes 12-56 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.

3. See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.

5. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.

7. See infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.

9. See infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
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RICO claim.10 Part III discusses recent legislative developments affecting corporate and business law in Virginia.1
II.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

A. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Private Rights of Action
In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,1 2 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a recent holding by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals's and considered two aspects of actions under
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act").' 4 Rule 14(a)9, adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to section 14(a), requires that no proxy
statement shall contain any statement that is "false or misleading
with respect to any material fact" or omit "any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading. . .,, In this case, the Court addressed two issues: whether
imprecise statements of reason, opinion, or belief are actionable
under section 14(a); and whether actions under section 14(a) may
be maintained by shareholders who collectively own such a small
number of shares that an action proposed in a proxy statement can
be authorized without their votes.' 6 In a lengthy opinion written by
Justice Souter, accompanied by multiple partial concurrences and
dissents, the Court held that such statements may be actionable
10. See infra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 184-225 and accompanying text.
12. 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
13. Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2749 (1991). The Fourth Circuit held that an action for misrepresentation under § 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could be maintained by a shareholder who was a member of a minority group that collectively owned insufficient shares to prevent authorization
of the action proposed. Id. at 1121. Relying on Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970), the Court ruled that a finding that misrepresentations or omissions were material is
sufficient to establish causation in an action under § 14(a) where it is shown that a proxy
statement was an "essential link" in the accomplishment of the actions proposed in the
proxy statement. Id. at 1120-21 (citing Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374
(2nd Cir. 1974)). The Court adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning that the purpose of the
Exchange Act is remedial, and that to hold otherwise "would sanction all manner of fraud
and overreaching in the fortuitous circumstance that a controlling shareholder exists." Id.
(quoting Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2nd Cir. 1974) (quoting
Swanson v. American Consumer Industries Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331 (7th Cir. 1969))).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1990).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990).
16. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2755.
17. Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in judg-
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if knowingly false; but allowing minority shareholders whose votes
are not "required" for authorization of corporate action to maintain an action under section 14(a) would impermissibly extend the
implied private right of action under section 14(a).18
The plaintiff, Doris Sandberg, was a minority shareholder in
First American Bank of Virginia ("First American"), eighty-five
percent of which was owned by Virginia Bankshares, Inc. ("VBI").
First American Bankshares, Inc. ("FABI"), which owned VBI, proposed a merger of First American and VBI. Although VBI owned a
large enough percentage of First American to approve the proposed merger, under Virginia law the directors of First American
were required to notify the shareholders and submit the plan for
their approval. 19 FABI retained an investment advisor to determine the "fair price" to be paid for the minority shares. During a
presentation to FABI's executive committee, the advisor opined
that a price of forty-two dollars per share was fair. The executive
committee then approved the merger proposal at that price. At a
later board meeting, the directors voted to approve the merger and
recommend the suggested price to shareholders. No other investment advisor was consulted.2 0
The directors solicited proxies for voting on the merger at the
subsequent annual meeting. In their proxy statement, the directors
recommended the merger, stating that they had approved the plan
of merger because it constituted an opportunity for the minority
shareholders to obtain a "high" value for their stock and that the
price offered was "fair. ' 21 Most minority shareholders gave the
proxies requested.2 2 Sandberg did not, however, and after the
merger was approved, she alleged that the directors had not in fact
believed the price was "high" or the merger "fair." She argued that
they had recommended the merger to retain their board positions.
The trial court jury found for Sandberg and awarded damages of
eighteen dollars per share.23
ment; Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in part and dissented in part;
and Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, concurred in
part and dissented in part.
18. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct at 2754.
19. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(B), (D) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
20. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2755-56.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The jury found that $60.00 per share was an adequate valuation of Sandberg's
stock. Id.
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Addressing the first of the two issues, the Court agreed with the
Fourth Circuit that certain statements in FABI's proxy solicitation
were materially misleading under section 14(a). The Court stated
that statements of reasons, opinions, or beliefs, even when couched
in indefinite language, clearly may be material,24 and that the use
of imprecise terms in a proxy solicitation does not render inapplicable the requirement that the statement in which they are contained be reasonably accurate.25
The defendant directors argued that recognizing liability for a
false or misleading statement of their reasons for recommending
the proposed merger would "invite wasteful litigation of amorphous issues outside the readily provable realm of fact. '26 Discussing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,2 7 the Court distinguished the reasons for the limitation of the private right of action
in Blue Chip Stamps from the facts in this case. The Court
pointed out that in contrast to the autonomous oral testimony on
which the would-be plaintiffs in Blue Chip Stamps would have
had to base their actions, the truth or falsity of directors' statements of reasons or belief is characteristically susceptible of objective third-party proof through corporate minutes and other statements of record, as well as circumstantial evidence regarding
underlying facts.28
The Court stated that directors' statements of reasons or belief
are factual in two respects: the existence of the reason or belief
stated, and the subject matter underlying the reason or belief.29
The Court held that only statements untrue or misleading in both
respects are actionable under section 14(a), explaining that "it
would be rare to find a case with evidence solely of disbelief or
undisclosed motivation without further proof that the statement
24. Id. at 2757.
25. Id. at 2758-59.
26. Id. at 2757 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
27. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Court in Blue Chip addressed whether an implied private
right of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act should be extended to shareholders who
had neither bought nor sold shares in reliance on deceptive sales practices, but claimed to
have relied on them in taking no action. Because damages in such actions are based upon
the number of shares involved in a shareholder's decision, the Court reasoned that recognizing liability to those who had no objectively verifiable way of demonstrating that number
might increase nuisance litigation and held that only actual buyers and sellers could maintain such actions. Id.
28. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2758.
29. Id.

1991]

BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW

was defective as to its subject matter." 0 It then stated that allowing actions based solely on false or misleading statements about
the existence of a reason or belief would lead to the same difficul'ties of proof the Court sought to eliminate in Blue Chip Stamps.
The Court reasoned that although such actions could be proven
through objective means (and thus are apparently distinguishable
from Blue Chip Stamps), they might result in "strike suits and
attrition by discovery," and thereby would be inconsistent with the
Blue Chip Stamps policy considerations.-"
The defendant directors also argued that even if untrue or misleading statements of reason or belief are actionable, actions
should be permitted only if sufficient factual data that would enable a reader independently to determine the truth was absent
from an entire proxy statement.2 The Court pointed out that since
materiality is an element of actions under section 14(a), the presence of sufficient truth could render immaterial a statement that in
isolation might be misleading.3 3 However, it concluded that if a
misleading statement is material and the inclusion of certain other
facts does not "neutralize the deceptive," it remains material and
therefore actionable, for "[t]he point of a proxy statement, after
all, should be to inform, not to challenge the reader's critical
wits.

' 34

In this case, the Court concluded, "there was, in sum, no

more of a compelling case for the statement's immateriality than
for its accuracy." 35
Although the Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the
proxy statement issued by the directors of FABI was materially
misleading, it held that no damages were recoverable because section 14(a) does not provide a private right of action for shareholders who hold an insufficient number of shares to affect a decision
by a majority shareholder to take a given course of action. The
Court noted that the class of shareholders who brought the action
in this case owned only fifteen percent of the total shares and
stated that their votes were "not required by law or corporate by30. Id. at 2760.
31. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that "not every sentence that...

refers to motivation for Directors' actions, leads us into this psychic thicket," and stated
that the "normal" principles governing misrepresentation of facts in 14(a) cases should apply. Id. at 2767 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).

32. Id. at 2760.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 2760-61.
35. Id. at 2761.
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law to authorize the transaction giving rise to the claim." 6 The
Court distinguished Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,3 7 upon which
the Fourth Circuit based its decision, on the ground that in Mills
the majority shareholder did not hold sufficient shares to approve
the subject transaction. 8 However, in its holding, the Court did
not clarify the Mills criterion or restate it so as to avoid the use of
the indistinct term "essential link." Rather, it applied the "essential link" language and found both theories advanced by the respondents inadequate to explain why the proxy statement was an
essential link in the subject merger. The Court stated that to allow
a private right of action on these facts would extend the scope of
implied private rights of action under section 14(a) beyond the
holding of Mills. 9
The first of the two "essential link" theories was based upon
FABI's desire to avoid bad shareholder relations.4 0 This theory
36. Id. Pursuant to § 13.1-718(E) of the Code, the proposed merger required approval by

"more than two-thirds of all the votes entitled to be cast.

..

VA.

CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(E)

(Repl. Vol. 1989).
37. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
38. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2762-63. In Mills, rather than requiring proof from
each individual minority shareholder that he or she had relied upon the misstatements and
affected the vote, the Court held that:
[w]here there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient
showing of causal relationship ... if... he proves that the proxy solicitation itself,
rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in
the accomplishment of the transaction. This objective test will avoid the impracticalities of determining how many votes were affected, and by resolving doubts in favor of
those the statute is designed to protect, will effectuate the congressional policy of
ensuring that the shareholders are able to make an informed choice when they are
consulted on corporate transactions.
396 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added). In Mills, the Court explicitly reserved without decision
the question of "whether causation could be shown where the managemeint controls a sufficient number of shares to approve the transaction without any votes from the minority." Id.
at 385 n.7.
39. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2763. Justice Stevens disagreed, pointing out that
because the merger had been found by a jury to be unfair, the interest in providing a remedy to injured minority shareholders in Sandberg was stronger, not weaker, than in Mills.
Justice Stevens stated, "[that the solicitation of proxies is not required by law ... does not
authorize corporate officers, once they have decided for whatever reason to solicit proxies, to
avoid the constraints of the statute." Id. at 2768 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
Justice Kennedy also disagreed, reasoning that "the difficulties of proving or disproving
causation are, if anything, greater where the minority lacks sufficient votes to defeat [a]
proposal." Id. at 2771 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 2762. Evidence was adduced that the bank had wanted a "friendly transaction"
with a price "so high that any reasonable shareholder will accept it," and that management
had expressed concern that there be "no loss of support for the bank out in the community." Id. at 2771 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Brief for Ap-
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reasoned that had the proxy statement not been misleading, minority shareholders would not have voted to authorize the merger,
and would likely have communicated - perhaps to the public
-their reasons for not doing so. Given its concern for public relations, the bank would have either modified the terms of the merger
or declined to proceed."' The Court stated that this theory depended upon evidence the nature of which implicated the policy
issues of Blue Chip Stamps. 42 According to the Court, "[r]ehable

evidence [of the truth or sincerity of statements attributed to directors] would seldom exist. '43 Because "[d]irectors would understand the prudence of making [on the record] a few statements
44
about plans to proceed even without minority endorsement,
plaintiffs would be forced to attempt to discover contradictory oral
testimony.45
The second "essential link" theory was that the proxy statement
was a means by which minority shareholders had ratified the
merger.46 Therefore, it had removed one of the avenues through
which the merger might have been voidable under Virginia law, on
the ground that one of the directors of VBI was also a director of
FABI and thus subject to a conflict of interest.47 The Court stated
that the facts in this case did not require it to consider whether
section 14(a) provides a private cause of action for lost state remedies because a material misstatement or omission in the proxy
statement would itself render the vote solicited thereby insufficient
to constitute ratification. 48 The Court also noted that no state ap-

praisal remedy was lost through the section 14(a) violation because
none otherwise existed: "Va. Code § 6.1-43 specifically excludes
pellant at 99, 109, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2799 (1991) (No. 891448)).
41. Id. at 2762.
42. Id. at 2764.
43. Id. at 2765.

44. Id.
45. Id. Justice Kennedy disagreed, stating that the Blue Chip Stamp language did not fit
the facts of this case and "is not a sound objection in any event." Id. at 2771 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 2762.
47. Id. at 2766; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
48. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766. Justice Kennedy pointed out in his dissent
that if the Virginia statute governing director conflicts of interest incorporated a standard of
materiality different from that of the federal securities laws, the plaintiff could have lost her
state law remedy. Id. at 2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1989).

634
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bank mergers from application of § 13.1-730 [the Virginia appraisal
statute] .,,4
Both the holding in this case and the reasoning upon which it is
based5 0 exemplify the trend of the Court of narrowing or denying
the recognition of implied private rights of action under federal
statutes. 1 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that no
52
private right of action under section 14(a) should be recognized.
In a previous case cited in his concurrence, Justice Scalia had
made a strong argument for "get[ting] out of the business of implied private rights of action altogether." 53
Sandberg reveals tension among the members of the Court on
the issue of implied rights of action. For example, Justice Kennedy
and the justices who joined his opinion appeared to resist the narrowing in this case with the statement that "[w]here an implied
cause of action is well accepted by our own cases and has become
an established part of the securities laws ... we should enforce it
'54
as a meaningful remedy unless we are to eliminate it altogether.
Additionally, the majority opinion of Justice Souter implied a certain viability of implied rights of action in its statement that the
perceived lack of congressional intent to confer a private right of
action under section 14(a) is "a serious obstacle to the expansion"
of such rights, but "not, however, a necessarily insurmountable
barrier." 55 Referring to Blue Chip Stamps, Justice Souter stated:
[fiaced in that case with.., a claim for equality in rounding out
the scope of an implied private statutory right of action, we looked
to policy reasons for deciding where the outer limits of the right
should lie. We may do no less here, in the face of respondents' pleas
for a private remedy to place them on the same footing as shareholders with votes necessary for initial corporate action.5 6
49. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766 n.14 (quoting Appeal to Petition for Certiorari at 31a, 32a, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2799 (1991) (No. 891448)).
50. Justice Souter devoted a lengthy portion of the majority opinion to a general discussion of the principles governing the recognition of implied rights of action under federal
statutes. See id. at 2763-64.
51. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment) and the cases cited therein.
52. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2767 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192.
54. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
55. Id. at 2764.
56. Id.
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It appears that the Court is in the midst of changing its collective
thinking with respect to private rights of action implied under federal statutes.
B. Directors did not Meet Virginia's Statutory "Good Faith"
Standard
Addressing the important issue of state law in Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc.,5 7 the Fourth Circuit panel 58 left unclear
the extent to which directors are protected by Virginia's statutory
good faith standard. Under Virginia law, a corporate director
must discharge his duties "in accordance with his good faith business judgment" of the best interests of the corporation. 0 A director is entitled to rely on "information, opinions, reports, or statements" presented by persons as to matters he believes, in good
faith, are "within the person's professional or expert competence."' 1 The directors of First Americaif argued in their defense
that evidence of "bad faith" was lacking and that their reliance on
the advisor retained by FABI and their decision not to seek a second opinion were justified under the statute. The court rejected
these arguments and affirmed the jury's finding of a lack of good
faith, stating that the evidence "fully supports a view that the di'62
rectors exercised no independent judgment whatsoever.
It appears from this decision that more than good faith may be
required by a court to meet the good faith standard of section 13.1880 of the Code of Virginia ("Code"). It is not clear from the opinion how one could demonstrate that the statute's requirement of
63
good faith had been met.
In Sandberg, the Fourth Circuit also upheld the constitutional57. 891 F.2d 1112 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
58. The panel did not contain a judge from Virginia. Its members were Judge K.K. Hall
of West Virginia, Circuit Judge; Judge Eugene A. Gordon, Senior United States District
Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation; and Judge Richard
L. Voorhees, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation. Id. at 1116.
59. For the facts of Sandberg see supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
61. Id. § 13.1-690(B)(2).
62. Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1123.
63. The court referred to Sandberg's allegation as one of rubberstamping everything proposed by FABI. The opinion is silent as to what the court would have deemed necessary to
overturn the jury verdict. Id. at 1123; see also Elkins, DirectorsLiable Even if Shareholders
Cannot Prove Reliance on Faulty Advice, Va. Law. Weekly, Dec. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
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ity 64 of Virginia's statutory cap on the liability of directors.65 The
court relied on Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court of Virginia decisions that upheld Virginia's statutory cap on medical malpractice
liability.6 Given the reversal by the United States Supreme Court
of the portions of this case assigning liability to FABI and VBI,
further litigation with respect to the limitation of the liability of
the individual directors may ensue.
C. FDIC Priority Over Other Claims to Assets of Insolvent
Institutions
In Howard v. Haddad,67 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
joined the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in rejecting an assertion by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") that
it should have absolute priority over claimants seeking to recover
damages payable from the assets of institutions undergoing liquidation. In an action under Rule lOb-5, 5 Edward G. Howard sued
two directors of the ironically-named Trust Bank on grounds that
they had fraudulently induced him to purchase shares of stock in
the bank. The FDIC won district court motions to intervene and to
dismiss the action, 69 arguing that Howard's claim was derivative
because it arose out of the decrease in value of his shares that resulted from mismanagement and the FDIC, as liquidator, owned
all derivative causes of action against the bank and its officers and
directors. The FDIC also argued that even if Howard's claims were
not derivative, the FDIC's duty to satisfy creditors before shareholders7 0 meant that it should be accorded priority over the shareholders with respect to assets of the directors of the bank.7 1
64. 891 F.2d at 1125. The court reached the issue of constitutionality only with respect to
the right of trial by jury. It declined to address equal protection and due process challenges
not raised at the trial level.
65. Id. With respect to actions by or in the right of a corporation or by or on behalf of its
shareholders § 13.1-692.1 of the Code limits damages assessable against a director and arising out of a single transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct to the lesser of (1) an
amount that may be specified in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation
and (2) the greater of $100,000 or the amount of cash compensation received by the director
during the previous twelve months. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
66. See e.g. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989); Etheridge v. Medical Center
Hospitals, Inc., 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
67. 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
69. Howard v. Haddad, No. 88-1245-A (E.D. Va. 1989).
70. See 12 U.S.C. § 1S21(d) (1988).
71. Howard, 916 F.2d at 170.
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In response to the first of these arguments, the court distinguished Howard's claim from potential claims of mismanagement
by other shareholders. The court observed that the reason for the
decrease in value of Howard's shares was irrelevant to his claim of
fraudulent inducement and found that his claim was not derivative.72 Although the district court had not relied upon the "absolute priority" argument in dismissing Howard's claims, the appeals
court addressed it as an alternative ground upon which the dismissal could have been affirmed. Dismissing the FDIC's citation of
Fourth Circuit precedent in a footnote,73 the court expressly
74
adopted the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in FDIC v. Jenkins:
"Of course, it would be convenient to the FDIC to have an arsenal
of priorities, presumptions, and defenses to maximize recovery to
the insurance fund, but . . . [w]e are not convinced Congress [so
intended]. Any such priority will have to come from Congress, not
this court. '7 5 The Jenkins court had been strongly influenced by
the legislative history of the then-recently adopted Financial Institutions Reformation, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 76 An amendment conferring absolute priority on the FDIC
had specifically been rejected by the FIRREA conference
committee.7 7
D.

Cash Merger not Unlawful Distributionto Shareholders

C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett7 8 involved an action brought by
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Committee") of
72. Id. at 169-170.
73. "Contrary to the FDIC's assertion, this Circuit has never adopted the absolute priority rule in a similar context." Id. at 170 n.4. In FDIC v. American Bank Trust Shares, Inc.,
412 F. Supp. 302 (D.S.C. 1976), vacated and remanded, 558 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1977), on
remand 460 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.C. 1978), aff'd 629 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1980), the District
Court of South Carolina held initially that the FDIC, as general creditor, had priority over
subordinated capital noteholders of the bank. Id. On remand, the court only decided issues
that had been presented in a counterclaim, making no further findings with respect to the
priority issue. However, the court had stated in its initial ruling that the priority it conferred in the case was not absolute and was subject to a later "final determination." See
FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing final determination).
74. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989). The panel in Jenkins included Judge Walter
E. Hoffman, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting
by designation.
75. Howard, 916 F.2d at 170 (quoting FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir.
1989)).
76. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
77. See Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1538 n.1.
78. 124 Bankr. 689 (W.D. Va. 1990) (ruling on motion for dismissal filed Aug. 10, 1990)
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the former Craddock-Terry Shoe Corporation ("C-T"). In Barrett,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia confirmed that although a cash merger accomplished with
leveraged financing could in some circumstances be an unlawful
distribution, in the absence of fraud or insolvency at the time of
the transaction, directors who have properly discharged their fiduciary duties need not fear being second-guessed when the successor
company files for bankruptcy protection. 9
In June of 1985, the directors of C-T, having announced a proposed leveraged buyout of the company by its management at a
price of fifteen dollars per share, received unsolicited offers from
third parties who proposed cash mergers.80 In late 1985, an "Agreement in Principle" was signed to effect a cash merger with HH
Acquisition, Inc., a result of which C-T shareholders would receive
a price of twenty dollars per share.81 The merger was consummated
on April 30, 1986. A petition for bankruptcy was filed on October
21, 1987. Having discharged their duties under the rule of Revlon
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc."2 to obtain for shareholders the highest price for their shares,8 3 the former directors of
the company were faced in 1989 with this action, which arose out
of the bankruptcy filing.
The Committee claimed that before the "Agreement and Plan of
Merger" was executed in January of 1986, the C-T directors knew
or should have known that the transaction was to be financed
mostly by short-term debt secured by liens on the assets of C-T;
that repayment of the secured debt would require either increased
sales or reduced costs; that the company was not performing as
[hereinafter "Barrett I"]; C-T of Virginia v. Barrett, 124 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990)
(ruling on motion for summary judgment filed by both parties Nov. 27, 1990) [hereinafter
"Barrett II"].
79. Barrett II, 124 Bankr. at 699.
80. Barrett I, 124 Bankr. at 691.
81. Id.
82. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that once the
Revlon board of directors had decided to sell the company, its duty was no longer to protect
the corporation, but to maximize the amount that shareholders would receive.
83. Barrett I, 124 Bankr. at 692. The court dismissed a claim by the plaintiffs that no
Revlon duty had arisen and the directors of Craddock-Terry had breached a different fiduciary duty under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Under Unocal, when a sale is "not inevitable," the duty of directors is to determine whether a proposed
takeover is in the best interests of the company. The plaintiffs, as creditors of C-T, characterized themselves as members of one of the constituencies whose interests would have been
allied with those of the company as a whole in a Unocal analysis. Barrett 1, 124 Bankr. at
692.
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well as management had predicted; and that if the merger were
consummated, C-T would be "grossly undercapitalized. '84 The,
Committee sought to characterize the merger as a distribution to
shareholders, relying on Virginia's broad statutory definition of the
term, 5 and argued that, although the company did not pledge its
assets directly to its shareholders, it facilitated the encumbrance of
its assets by the purchasers "for the benefit of shareholders." 8 6 The
directors asserted that the compensation received by shareholders
came only from the parent of HH Holdings, and not from C-T.87
The court refused to dismiss this claim, 88 stating that if the directors had "actively participated" in encumbering the property of
the company, then the transaction could be a disguised distribution in violation of Virginia's statutory prohibition of distributions
by insolvent corporations.8 9
After additional discovery, both parties filed for summary judgment on the question of whether a distribution had occurred. The
court found the plaintiffs' interpretation of the definition of "distribution" to be "inconsistent with Virginia's statutory scheme."9 0
The court noted that the statutes governing distributions are separate from those governing mergers and reasoned that the absence
in the merger statutes of references to distribution considerations
implied a legislative intent that the issues be considered independently."1 The court then returned to a consideration of the facts in
this case and found that this was not a disguised merger, stating
that "[a]ll available evidence suggests that the directors expected
the company to continue operating after the buyout, and presumed
that their replacements would make proper distributions and payments to creditors in connection with their own fiduciary duties."9 2
84. Id. at 692.
85. Id. at 693. Distribution means "a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property, except its owns shares, or incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the
benefit of its shareholders in respect of any of its shares." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-603 (Repl.
Vol. 1989).
86. Barrett I, 124 Bankr. at 694 (citing Weiboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr.
488, 511 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)).

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
90. Barrett II, 124 Bankr. at 696. The court noted that the plaintiffs conceded at oral
argument that if their characterization were to prevail, every merger would be a distribution. Id.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 697.
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The court also found that even if the buyout was a distribution,
the directors would not be liable because their successors, not they,
had authorized the payment of cash to shareholders."e To hold the
directors of C-T responsible for the payments would require that
the court collapse the transactions comprising the buyout, an "extreme" step not warranted by the facts.94 The court distinguished
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Sohottenstein,95 the principal authority
relied upon by the plaintiffs in urging collapse. It found that in
Wieboldt the company had been insolvent prior to the transaction
in question, and the board had known of the insolvency before approving the transaction. 6 In this case, it was not alleged that C-T
was insolvent before the merger.
E. Voting and Ineffective Transfers of Stock
Lehman H. Young, Sr., incorporated his long-established printing business as Fairfax Printers, Inc., in 1970. 9 He periodically issued directions to a trustee to transfer to his son and two daughters an equal number of shares in the company. By May of 1984,
Young no longer had voting control. At that time, his son held 242
Class A (voting) shares,9" and each daughter held 241 shares originally issued to Young as Class A shares, but evidenced by certificates classifying them as Class B (non-voting) shares. No formal
action had been taken to reclassify the daughters' shares. Young
had simply designated them Class B on the certificates issued at
the time of the transfers. The certificates had been delivered to
Young as "attorney" 99 for his daughters, neither of whom was
aware of the apparent transfers of stock.
In 1987, after a business dispute between father and son, Young
caused a total of 254 of the shares apparently owned by his daughters to be transferred to him as Class A shares. His son successfully
petitioned the Circuit Court of Fairfax County to find the transfer
invalid and vacate subsequent actions taken by shareholder vote.1 "
93. Barrett II, 124 Bankr. at 697-699.
94. Id. at 698.
95. 94 Bankr. 488 (Bankr., N.D. 11. 1988).
96. Barrett II, 124 Bankr. at 698.
97. Young v. Young, 240 Va. 57, 59, 393 S.E.2d 398, 399 (1990).
98. Young's son had purchased one share for $100.00. Id. at 61, 393 S.E.2d at 400.
99. Young had acknowledged receipt of the certificates by signing his daughter's names in
the stock transfer ledger with the notation "L H Young Sr. Atty." Neither daughter had
ever appointed Young her attorney in fact. Id. at 60, 393 S.E.2d at 399.
100. See Young v. Fairfax Printers, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 78 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1989).

1991]

BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW

The Supreme Court of Virginia looked beyond the prima facie
correctness of the stock transfer ledger 10 1 and held that the shares
had never been effectively transferred by Young to his daughters
because he had retained possession of the stock certificates. The
court reasoned that because Young's daughters had given no consideration for the shares, the transfers at issue should be analyzed
as purported gifts. 102 Both the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code require that for a gift to be effective, there must be
delivery and acceptance. 10 3 The court found that the elements of
delivery and acceptance were "entirely lacking," and thus no effective gifts had been made because Young had retained dominion
and control over the certificates evidencing ownership of the
shares. 0 4
The trial court had found that delivery had been completed because Young had acknowledged receipt of the certificates on behalf
of his daughters and the shareholders had annually ratified all
dealings of the directors and officers of the corporation. Consequently, the trial court ruled the parties were estopped to challenge either the delivery or the apparent reclassification. 0 5
The supreme court did not reach the issue of whether shares can
be converted simply by the issuance of certificates bearing a new
class designation. It stated only that Young's attempt to reclassify
the shares at issue in that manner was "ineffectual."' 06
F.

Oppression of Minority Shareholders

In Giannotti v. Hamway, °7 the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a 1987 ruling of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond
that ordered the dissolution of a close corporation because its officers and directors had engaged in oppressive conduct toward minority shareholders within the meaning of former section 13.1-94
of the Code. 08 The court also resolved any existing uncertainty re101. Young, 240 Va. at 62, 393 S.E.2d at 400 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-661(B) (Repl.
Vol. 1989)).
102. Id. at 62, 393 S.E.2d at 401.
103. Id. at 63, 393 S.E.2d at 401 (citing Taylor v. Smith, 199 Va. 871, 874, 102 S.E.2d 160,
162-63 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.8-309, -313 (Cum. Supp. 1989)).
104. Young, 240 Va. at 62-64, 393 S.E.2d at 400-01.
105. Fairfax Printers,18 Va. Cir. at 80.
106. Young, 240 Va. at 64, 393 S.E.2d at 401.
107. 239 Va. 14, 387 S.E.2d 725 (1990).
108. Section 13.1-94 of the Code has been superseded by § 13.1-747 of the Code, which is
similar in its relevant provisions.
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garding the remedies available in such cases, 09 stating that judicial
dissolution pursuant to the Code 10 constitutes the exclusive remedy for oppressive conduct."
The plaintiffs charged that the defendants paid themselves excessive direct compensation; 1 2 profited from improper transactions
between the corporation and entities related to or controlled by
certain of the officers and directors; and failed to pay adequate
dividends." 3 Although the supreme court characterized the con-

duct of the defendants as "egregious, domineering, blatantly unfair, and prejudicial to the plaintiffs," 1 4 it appears to have based

its holding on a finding of oppression
in general, rather than on
5
specific findings as to the charges."1

Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc. ("Libbie") was formed in
1967, and began operating its first nursing home in 1970. In 1980,
when the claims in this case were first filed, it also operated two
additional facilities through wholly-owned subsidiaries. The shareholders represented eight families. The three plaintiffs had initially
controlled the corporation, but the expiration of a voting trust resulted in their loss of control in 1975.116 Upon assuming control,

the five defendants reduced the size of the Board of Directors7 to
five and elected themselves as the only directors and officers."
At trial, the defendants asserted that all dealings between them
and the corporation lay within the protection of the business judgment rule. They offered evidence that they were actively involved
109. See Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 216 S.E.2d 18 (1975); White v. Perkins,
213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972). Both of these cases are discussed in Jordon v. Bowman
Apple Products Co., 728 F. Supp. 409, mem., No. 89-00210C, 12-14 (W.D. Va. 1990).
110. Formerly § 13.1-94, now § 13.1-747 of the Code.
111. Giannotti, 239 Va. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at 733.
112. The trial court pointed out that excessive "compensation" included "salaries, bonuses, fringe benefits, directors' fees, expense allowances, reimbursements, and other compensation." Hamway v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 10 Va. Cir. 245, 253 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1987).
113. Giannotti, 239 Va. at 18, 387 S.E.2d at 727.
114. Id. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at 733.
115. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.

116. While in the majority and before the date on which the voting trust was to expire,
the three plaintiffs had authorized the issuance of 80,000 shares to two of their number of
shares in exchange for personal guarantees of corporate debt. This issuance would have allowed plaintiffs to retain control had it not been rescinded on the ground that fiduciary
duties to stockholders had been violated. Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 215 Va. 782, 213 S.E.2d
774 (1975).
117. Hamway v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 10 Va. Cir. 245, 248 (City of Richmond Cir.
Ct. 1987).
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in the corporate business, that the market value of Libbie stock
had risen substantially during the time they were in control, and
that transactions with related parties were fair to Libbie and reasonably priced. 11 s
The supreme court defined oppressive conduct as that which
"departs from the standards of fair dealing and violates the principles of fair play on which persons who entrust their funds to a
corporation are entitled to rely." 11 9 The court also noted that "the
term does not mean that a corporate disaster may be imminent
and does not necessarily mean fraudulent conduct. ' 120 Itfurther
stated that corporate officers have duties of fidelity similar to those
of trustees, and that a director who receives personal advantage or
profit must "account therefor to the corporation," and must bear
the burden of proof to show that transactions between himself and
the corporation have been fair. 121 The court characterized this
122

principle as an exception to the business judgment rule.

In affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court stated
that the findings of the chancellor appointed by the trial court
were in conflict with evidence presented by the defendants on almost every issue. 123 With respect to the issue of unreasonable compensation, the chancellor accorded great weight to testimony by
the administrators of the three Libbie facilities that the five defendants had participated insufficiently in the operations of the facilities to justify their compensation. The "main actor" of the five
had, at most, approved administrators' decisions regarding day-today operation. Another director, a lawyer, was paid on an hourly
basis for activities duplicating his corporate responsibilities. Finally, the director who served as the chief financial officer "demonstrated no knowledge of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the
principal sources of Libbie's income.

1 24

The court stated that al-

though courts "are hesitant to question" reasonableness of compensation when set by a disinterested board, in this case such dis118. Giannotti, 239 Va. at 21-22, 387 S.E.2d at 729-30.
119. Id. at 23, 387 S.E.2d at 730.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 24, 387 S.E.2d at 731 (citing Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 215 Va. 782, 789, 213
S.E.2d 774, 779 (1975); Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 366, 6 S.E.2d 633, 642 (1940); Waddy
v. Grimes, 154 Va. 615, 648, 153 S.E. 807, 817 (1930)).
122. Id. at 24, 387 S.E.2d at 731.
123. Id. at 22, 387 S.E.2d at 730.
124. Id. at 26, 387 S.E.2d at 732.
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interest was "impossible.' '125 The court noted that one of plaintiffs'
experts testified that the management functions performed by all
five defendants could have been performed by one individual. The
court concluded that the defendants were only part-time employees of Libbie with significant outside business interests. 2 6
Although both courts found in favor of the plaintiffs on the issues of unreasonable compensation and failure to pay adequate
dividends, neither court distinguished clearly between these issues.
The plaintiffs asserted at trial that the officers' salaries, as set by
themselves, were excessive and constituted a "waste of corporate
resources denying to plaintiffs adequate dividends.' 27 The plaintiffs also asserted that "the profits of the corporation as against the
salaries of the defendant officers reveal that the dividends declared
during the time the defendants had controlled the corporation constitute inadequate return on their investment.' 2 8 The supreme
court stated that although the business appeared to have been
profitable, its before-tax profit was less than half that of comparable facilities. It further found that the trial court was justified in
finding that "Libbie would have been more profitable except for
the excessive compensation extracted from the corporation by
defendants."' 12
Notwithstanding its holding that oppression had occurred, the
trial court did not find the allegedly improper related transactions
voidable. 3 0 Yet the related transactions were apparently a part of
the basis on which the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
holding. The supreme court referred to "the chancellor's finding
that defendants breached their fiduciary duties in certain transactions," and stated that "[i]n view of the trial court's findings,...
defendants have failed to carry their burden of proving the fairness
and propriety of [certain] transactions.' 3'
In discussing the related transactions in this case, neither court
referred to Virginia's statute regarding director conflicts of inter125. Id. at 24, 387 S.E.2d at 731.
126. Id. at 27, 387 S.E.2d at 732.
127. Hamway, 10 Va. Cir. at 250.
128. Id.
129. Giannotti, 239 Va. at 27, 387 S.E.2d at 733.
130. "Despite the presence of some considerations, the [c]ourt finds that the transaction
involved in this case are not voidable for lack of disclosure of personal interests." 10 Va. Cir.
at 255 (emphasis added).
131. Giannotti,239 Va. at 30, 387 S.E.2d at 733.
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est. 132 The statute provides in essence that a "conflict of interests

transaction" is not voidable if approved by a majority of directors
or shareholders who have no personal interest in the transaction,
or if it is fair to the corporation. 3 The statute's unavailability in
cases where contracts are unfair, yet receive the prescribed vote of
approval, demonstrates its permissive rather than restrictive
nature.
Giannotti illustrates the power conferred by section 13.1-747 of
the Code. Oppressive conduct may be actionable even if specific
elements of such conduct are not actionable under other statutes.1 34 But the exclusive remedy of dissolution may be insufficient
or inappropriate to remedy oppression in some cases. Where mismanagement has significantly lessened the value of corporate assets, dissolution may place oppressed shareholders in a worse position than the continuation of business with a change in
management. Further, where the business has profited and assets
have grown, a more equitable remedy would substitute or include
the restoration of these diverted profits. If oppressors have
siphoned off corporate assets for their own benefit, they should not
be allowed to retain their ill-gotten gains. And, as pointed out by
Justice Gordon, dissenting in this case, "[t]o liquidate the corporation is to kill the goose that laid the golden egg. "35
G. Recovery from a Corporationfor Liabilities of its Predecessor
Several recent cases have addressed the issue of whether liabilities of a predecessor can be recovered from a successor corporation.
Although the nature of the liabilities in these cases differ, and the
reasoning behind the holdings is not always clear, they share a judicial focus on the equitable aspects of their outcomes.
1. By Implication, Successor Liability for Fraud
In City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, 36 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed a jury finding that a purchaser of business
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
133. Id. The statute defines a conflict of interest transaction as "a transaction with the
corporation in which a director of the corporation has a direct or indirect personal interest."
Id. § 13.1-691(A).
134. E.g., see supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
135. 239 Va. at 30, 387 S.E.2d at 734.
136. 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1990).
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assets had, by implication, assumed responsibility for the liabilities
of the seller. GHA Lock Joint, Incorporated ("GHA") had purchased the assets of a pipe manufacturing division of Interpace
Corporation ("Interpace"). The purchase occurred two years after
Interpace had agreed to supply a third party with pipe meeting the
specifications of a contract with the City of Richmond. Evidence
demonstrated that Interpace had been aware when it entered into
the supply agreement that some of its pipe was defective.1 3 7 Based
on this evidence, the trial court jury found that Interpace had
committed fraud.1 38
Generally, when a corporation sells or otherwise transfers assets
to another, the transferee is not liable for the debts and liabilities
of the transferor unless the parties have agreed to the contrary; the
terms of a bona fide asset purchase agreement will govern. 3 " The
terms of the asset purchase agreement between Interpace and
GHA limited GHA's responsibility for defective products of Interpace to $200,000 or less "for any single project. 1 40 However, the
trial court jury found that GHA had demonstrated, by its conduct,
an intent to assume "the contract"' 4 1 and therefore by implication
assumed unlimited responsibility for all liabilities related to the
contract. In affirming that verdict, the appeals court relied heavily
on the willingness of GHA to repair defects in the pipe and its
failure to direct the City to seek a remedy from Interpace. GHA
137. Madison Management Group, 918 F.2d at 442-43.
138. Id. at 443. Although the court did not find that GHA independently had committed
fraud, evidence showed that GHA employees, who were former employees of Interpace, participated in public representations that the pipe met contract specifications after they had
become aware that problems existed. Id. at 451.
139. See, e.g., 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 7122
(rev. perm. ed. 1990). If the terms of a transaction were not legally enforceable, it would be
difficult to determine the appropriate consideration.
140. The agreement provided in part:
Purchaser shall assume no liabilities of any character whatsoever . . . except ...
[liabilities arising out of claims, whether before or after the Closing Date, of an alleged defect in a product or service of the Division by a purchaser thereof, an owner
thereof, or any third party claiming damages or relief as a result thereof; provided,
however, . . . that Purchaser does not hereby assume liability, and in no event shall
Purchaser be liable or incur losses, damages, costs, and expenses (excluding attorneys'
fees and disbursements), in excess of $200,000 for any single project.
Brief for Appellants at 36 n.18, City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, 918 F.2d
438 (4th Cir. 1990).
141. GHA had used the name "Interpace;" publicly taken credit for the work of Interpace
on the project; assumed responsibility for completing the project; collected money under the
project; and participated in repairs when defects in the pipe had become apparent. 918 F.2d
at 450-51.
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presented evidence at trial and on appeal that it had repaired the
pipe only out of a desire to maintain good customer relations, and
had stated in a letter to the third party who had installed the pipe
that it "d[id] not feel" that it was liable for the costs of repair.14 2
However, the evidence presented by GHA failed to convince the
appellate panel that the jury verdict was unsupportable.
The court also upheld the jury's award of punitive damages
against GHA as a successor to the liabilities of Interpace. The
court stated that imposing punitive damages on a successor in interest of a wrongdoer serves the purpose of deterrence as well as
imposing the damages on the wrongdoer itself because "[i]n Virginia, the purpose of a punitive damage award is not simply to deter the wrongdoer from future wrongdoing; it is 'to display to
others an example of the consequences they may expect if they

engage in similar conduct.'

"143

The opinion in this case is silent as to why the City did not include Interpace, other divisions of which were still in business, as a
defendant in this case, and whether there was any provision in the
asset purchase agreement for indemnification of GHA by
Interpace.
2.

Successor Liability for Contractual Debts

In Southgate Associates v. Aker Industry,4 4 Southgate, a lessor,
sought recovery for breach of a commercial lease from both Aker,
its lessee, and JHA of Virginia, Inc. ("JHA"), an alleged successor
to Aker. Aker did not respond or appear.
JHA asserted that it could not be found liable because the evidence failed to establish a transfer of assets from Aker to JHA. Yet
Southgate presented evidence that Aker office equipment had been
transferred to JHA and subsequently surrendered to Aker creditors; former Aker clients did business with JHA; blinds purchased
by Aker were installed by JHA; and "proceeds ' 14 5 received by JHA
were forwarded to an Aker creditor. Remarkably, the court found
that a transfer of assets from Aker to JHA was "conspicuously absent," and stated that JHA and Aker Industries were separate en142. Id. at 451.
143. Id. at 456 (emphasis in original) (citing F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 214 Va. 246,
251, 198 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1973)).
144. 20 Va. Cir. 168 (County of Chesterfield Cir. Ct. 1990).

145. The opinion does not state from what source the proceeds had been derived.
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tities and the claim against JHA failed for want of privity.'1" In an
item-by-item response to Southgate's evidence, the court detailed
the reasons why the obvious connection between the two entities
was not legally sufficient to constitute a transfer of assets. 14
Both parties in this case, as well as both parties in Madison
Management Group,'14 cited Crawford Harbor Associates v. Blake
Construction Co.' 49 to support their contrary arguments. Southgate cited Crawford for the proposition that certain exceptions to
the general rule of nonliability of successor entities exist, one being
a set of circumstances in which a purchasing corporation is a
"mere continuation" of a selling corporation. 5 0 Having found that
in this case there was no transfer of assets, the court apparently
reasoned that JHA therefore was not a "successor entity." It did
not address whether any of the exceptions to the general rule were
applicable.
Another exception to the general rule of nonliability is a
purchase transaction found to be "fraudulent in fact."'' Fraud in
the transaction is to be distinguished from fraud as the source of
the liability in question, as occurred in Madison Management
Group. The Madison Management Group opinion contains no
mention of any allegation that the sale of Interpace assets to GHA
was itself an attempt by the two entities to defraud the City. But
the court's final words in Southgate are consistent with the result
in Madison Management Group: "The harshness of the nonliability rule occurs when the successor corporation derives a benefit
from the predecessor corporation without accepting associated lia146. 20 Va. Cir. at 169-70.
147. Investment monies were loaned to Mr. Aker by a personal friend for JHA. Aker Industries' office equipment initially taken by JHA without consideration was returned
for the benefit of Aker Industries' creditors. No evidence was presented of a transfer
of accounts receivable. JHA secured former Aker Industries' clients. However, [the
name of] these parties were readily available from [a local business publication].
JHA's installation of the remaining Aker Industries' blinds fails to constitute a transfer sufficient to impose liability.
Southgate Associates, 20 Va. Cir. at 170.
148. 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
149. 661 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Va. 1987).
150. Southgate Associates, 20 Va. Cir. at 169. The other exceptions recited in Southgate
are circumstances warranting a finding "that there was consolidation of the two corporations," and fraud. Id. (quoting Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake Constr. Co., 661 F. Supp.
880, 883 (E.D. Va. 1987) (citing People's Nat'l Bank of Rocky Mount v. Morris, 152 Va. 814,
148 S.E. 828 (1929))).
151. Id. at 169 (citing Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake Constr. Co. 661 F. Supp. 880, 883
(E.D. Va. 1987)).
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bilities and obligations.152No showing of such a benefit has been established by plaintiff.

3. Successor Liability for Negligence
In Hancock v. Shoenle and Philips PoliceEquipment Co.,153 the

Circuit Court of Alexandria ruled on an action by the administrator of an estate against two defendants - an individual who, she
claimed, had negligently sold a firearm to the decedent whose estate she administered, and the corporation into which the "individual company" was subsequently "merged.

' 154

In sustaining the de-

murrer of the corporate defendant, the court recognized that
liability "is carried over" in a stock merger of two corporations
where the surviving corporation "is entitled to" all of the assets
and liabilities of the former entities. However, it could not find authority passing individual liability to a corporation when the corporation "acquires" a sole proprietorship.
The court's reference in Hancock to the transfer of all assets and
liabilities implies a focus similar to that in Madison Management
Group and Southgate. The reason why the corporation had not assumed the liabilities of a sole proprietorship with which it had purportedly "merged" is not clear.
H. Derivative Action by a Class of One
In a recent memorandum opinion, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia distinguished family relationships from "situational similarities" to enable a twenty-two
percent shareholder in a family corporation to maintain a derivative action against her brother. In Jordon v. Bowman Apple Products Co.,15 5 Patricia Jordon, one of four shareholders and a sister of

the company president, alleged that her brother had misapplied
corporate assets and improperly participated in related partnerships. The other two shareholders were Peggy Zirkle, Jordon's sister, and their mother. Zirkle and her mother had surrendered voting control of their stock to the brother through a voting trust
152. Id. at 170.
153. Law No. 12887, letter op. (City of Alexandria Cir. Ct. 1989).
154. The three paragraph letter opinion does not make clear the exact nature of the operation by which the individual became part of the corporation.
155. 728 F. Supp. 409, mem., No. 89-00210C (W.D. Va. 1990).
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agreement. 158 Jordon brought a derivative action against all three
of the other shareholders, seeking to recover for the corporation
57
her brother's allegedly ill-gotten gains.1
The defendants moved to dismiss in part on the ground that
Jordan did not "fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the shareholders or members similarly situated."'158 Zirkle, who
owned a percentage of the corporation equal to that of Jordon,
shared the additional situational similarities of nonmanagement
status and being a member of the family. Thus, the defendants
argued that because Zirkle was named a defendant and joined the
motion to dismiss, Jordon failed to represent the interests of the
entire class of those similarly situated.
In the absence of Virginia precedent, the court considered two
contrary cases from other jurisdictions,' 59 concluding that a single
shareholder could occupy a unique position and thereby constitute
a legitimate class of one.'6 0 In refusing to dismiss this derivative
action, the court noted that rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure grants the court broad discretion in determining what
constitutes "similarity of situation," and stated that the existence
of a,voting arrangement that alters the power structure of a corporation from that implied by ownership percentages alone is
"clearly important" in this type of case.' 6 '
156. Jordon, 728 F.Supp. at 413.
157. The derivative action was one of several counts in Jordan's complaint.
158. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
159. Jordon, 728 F. Supp. at 412 (citing Halsted Video, Inc. v. Guttillo, 115 F.R.D. 177
(N.D. Ill. 1987); contra Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F.Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
In Kuzimickey, each of six shareholders who were not defendants submitted affidavits
stating that the single plaintiff did not represent their interests and that the action at issue
was not in the best interests of the corporation. Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F. Supp.
226, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Somewhat confusingly, the court stated that under rule 23.1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a single plaintiff's derivative action could not be maintained unless she represented the interests of shareholders other than herself. Id. at 231.
The Halsted Video court correctly characterized the Kuzmickey holding as a conclusion
that the plaintiff did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of similarly situated
shareholders. Halsted Video, Inc. v. Guttilo, 115 F.R.D. 177, 180 (N.D. Ill. 1987). The Halsted court distinguished the single plaintiff in Halsted as one who was not similarly situated
with any of the corporation's other shareholders, and held that as such, a single shareholder
could maintain a derivative action under rdle 23.1. Id.
160. Jordon, 728 F. Supp. at 413.
161. Id.
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I. Bank as a Seller Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
In a memorandum opinion filed March 7, 1991,162 the United

States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Judge
Kiser presiding, denied summary judgment to the defendant, Central Fidelity Bank ("CFB"). It reasoned that there were disputed
material issues of fact as to whether CFB could be subject to liability as a seller of securities under section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 193313 ("Securities Act"). Recent United States Supreme Court
precedent holds that an entity can be a "seller" if it solicits the
purchase of a security and receives consideration for its services.164
As a service to Gunnoe Sausage Co., Inc. ("Gunnoe"), CFB's
Investment Division invested excess funds from Gunnoe's checking
account in commercial paper. Gunnoe and CFB -disagreed as to
whether Gunnoe was routinely consulted before each purchase was
made. However, CFB argued in its motion for summary judgment
that even if it had selected each investment, it could not be held
liable for related investment losses because it had merely acted in
accord with standard banking industry practice and was not a
"seller" under the Securities Act."8 5
According to Gunnoe, CFB had suggested that Gunnoe authorize
the investment of its excess funds, which it did, expressing a preference for conservative investments. In selecting the paper to be
purchased, CFB relied on Standard and Poor's Commercial Paper
Rating Guide. CFB argued that it was justified in relying on ratings agencies for its information because it was not a full service
broker-dealer. Gunnoe maintained that such reliance was unjustified because the Standard and Poor's Guide provided stale and insufficient information and other evidence demonstrated that the issuer of the paper was in significantly worse financial condition
than its Standard and Poor's rating indicated. Therefore, according to Gunnoe, CFB was guilty of material misrepresentation or
omissions of fact in connection with the offer or sale of securities.
In addressing the issue whether CFB could be a seller or offeror,
Judge Kiser noted that the "substantial factor" test previously re162. Gunnoe Sausage Co. v. Central Fidelity Bank, No. 90-0320-R, slip op. (W.D. Va.

1991).
163. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
164. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
165. Gunnoe, No. 90-0320-R, slip op. at 2.
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lied upon in the Fourth Circuit 6 6 had been expressly rejected by

the United States Supreme Court in Pinter v. Dahl.167 Judge Kiser
stated that under Pinter,even one who has not held title to a security can be a "seller" if he solicited the purchase of the security
and received consideration for his services. In applying this rule to
the facts, Judge Kiser found disputed issues of material fact as to
whether CFB solicited Gunnoe's purchase of commercial paper in
this case. Therefore, 8 he refused to grant the bank's motion for
16
summary judgment.

Judge Kiser also refused to grant summary judgment on a parallel count under Virginia's Blue Sky Law.' He stated that the appropriate inquiry in this context was "very similar" to that under
the Securities Act: "whether CFB received compensation for advice
regarding or the actual purchase of securities.'
7
since been settled.1 1

70

The case has

J. Minority Shareholder Allegation of FraudulentFreezeout Activities Stated RICO Claim
On remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of a recent decision, 7 1 in Walk v. Baltimore and
166. Under the substantial factor test, a court was to consider whether an entity was a
proximate cause of or a substantial factor in the sale of securities. See Adalman v. Baker,
Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986).
167. Gunnoe, No. 90-320-R, slip op. at 4-5 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988)).
Pinter addressed only section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) ("Securities Act"). The courts of appeal have since extended the definition of "offer or sale" to
section 12(2) of the Act.
168. CFB also contended that it could not have lawfully been a seller of securities because
the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits national banks from acting as sellers within the meaning of
section 12(2) of the Securities Act. This contention, said Judge Kiser, "merely begs the
question." Gunnoe, No. 90-0320-R, slip op. at 7.
169. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-501 to -527.3 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1991).

170. Gunnoe, No. 90-0320-R, slip op. at 8.
171. Courts in other jurisdictions have disagreed as to whether section 12(2) applies to
sales other than those pursuant to initial offerings. For decisions finding § 12(2) inapplicable
in the secondary market, see, e.g., T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc. v. Preletz, 749 F.
Supp. 705 (D. Md. 1990); Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 931 (N.D.
Cal. 1990); and Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1989). For decisions
finding that § 12(2) is not limited to initial offerings see, e.g., Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co.
750 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit); and Elysian Federal
Say. Bank v. First Interregional Equity, 713 F. Supp. 737 (D.N.J. 1989). See also VT Investors v. R & D Funding Corp., 733 F. Supp. 823 (D.N.J. 1990) (construing the term "solicit"
under Pinter).
172. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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Ohio Railroad7 3 the Fourth Circuit reversed in part its previous
affirmation of the granting of a motion to dismiss. 1 4 The plaintiffs
in Walk alleged a ten-year fraudulent freezeout scheme, involving
CSX Corporation and several of its subsidiaries, 5 to deprive minority shareholders of the Baltimore and Ohio ("B&O") Railroad
of their just profits. The Fourth Circuit had earlier affirmed a Maryland District Court's rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiffs'
RICO claims for failure sufficiently
to allege the requisite "pattern
'17 6
of racketeering activity.

The RICO statute defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" as
"at least two" acts within ten years. 177 Interpreting the statute, the

Supreme Court has stated that two acts may not be sufficient to
form a "pattern," and that "continuity" and "relationship" are the
distinctive characteristics of a RICO "pattern.' 17

8

Lower courts

have struggled to apply these concepts; their analyses have focused
on differing aspects of the subject activities. 79 The Fourth Circuit
has stated that although separate acts can be part of a single
"scheme" and yet form the requisite "pattern," a "single, limited
scheme" should not be transformed into a RICO violation simply
because, for example, several acts of mail or wire fraud were involved. The court had reasoned that given the frequency of mail
and wire communication, such an interpretation would cause
nearly every fraudulent act to meet the requirements of the RICO
statute. 80
In its initial decision, the court found, after a lengthy and
thoughtful analysis, that the activities of B&O were "limited in
scope to the accomplishment of a single discrete objective," that of
forcing out the minority shareholders in a single corporate structure. It held that this could not constitute a pattern of continuing
173. 890 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1989).

174. Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 847 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
175. The plaintiffs held minority interests in B&O Railroad, a Maryland railroad corporation approximately 98.5% of which was owned by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, a Virginia corporation wholly owned by CSX. Other subsidiaries of CSX were also involved.
Walk, 847 F.2d at 1101.
176. See Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 659 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1987).
177. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5).
178. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
179. The court in this case characterized the terms "continuity" and "relationship" in
this context as "inherently contradictory." Walk, 847 F.2d at 1103; see id. at 1103-05.
180. Id. at 1104.
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criminal activity of RICO nature.""1 On remand, the court took
note of the Supreme Court's discussion in H.J., Inc. of the continuity requirement, in which the Court emphasized that although
the activity in question might have ended with the accomplishment of a single objective, requisite continuity could be found in
the fact that the activity had extended "over a substantial period
of time. ' 18 2 The court concluded that its earlier analysis had probably given "too little weight to the sheer duration of the predicate
acts alleged, and too much to their closed-ended character."1 83
III.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In contrast to the legislative focus on public companies of recent
years, some of the most significant legislation of 1990 and 1991 occurred in the realm of the small, privately-held concern.
A.

Virginia Limited Liability Company Act
With the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act" 4 ("Act"), the

Virginia General Assembly has authorized a new hybrid form of
entity for small businesses. 185 The Act is discussed fully in another
article in this survey. 86
181. Id. at 1105. The court noted that "virtually every" action taken by those in control
of a corporation could otherwise be challenged under RICO, which would not only have a
chilling effect on legitimate transactions, but also was not likely to be a use of the RICO
statute intended by Congress. The court cautioned, however, that it did not intend to rule
out the application of the RICO statute to all schemes occurring in the corporate context.

Id.
182. 890 F.2d at 689-90 (quoting H.J., Inc, v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S.
229, 242 (1989)).
183. Id. at 689.
184. VA. CODE ANN.

§§ 13.1-1000 to -1069 (Cum. Supp. 1991).

185. The first limited liability company law was passed in Wyoming in 1977, but could
not confer on members the full benefits of its hybrid nature until the Internal Revenue
Service ruled in 1988 that it would be granted partnership treatment for federal income tax
purposes. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. Virginia is one of five other states that have
now enacted similar statutes; legislation has been introduced in eight additional states.
Partnership,CorporationAren't Only Ways to Start Out, Wall St. J., May 14, 1991, at 2,
col, 3.
186. See Farmer & Mezullo, Virginia Limited Liability Company Act Annual Survey of
Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. LAw REv. 789 (1991).
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B. New Kinds of Agreements of Shareholders or Members Authorized for Both Stock and Nonstock Corporations
Section 13.1-671.1 of the Code, 8 7 adopted by the 1990 General
Assembly, authorizes provisions in agreements among shareholders
of small stock corporations' 8 that may conflict with certain requirements of the Stock Corporation Act." 9 Such provisions may
eliminate or restrict the powers of a board of directors; transfer to
one or more shareholders or other persons all or part of the power
to manage the corporation; govern the exercise or allocation of voting powers; govern the authorization or making of distributions; require the dissolution of the corporation at the request of one or
more shareholders or upon the occurrence of a specific event; and
otherwise govern the management of the corporation or the relationships among or between directors, shareholders, and the corporation in any way not contrary to public policy.190
This recent law offers those who represent small corporations
enhanced flexibility in structuring small corporations to meet the
needs of individual clients. It also allows the elimination of some of
the routine "housekeeping" activities otherwise required. For example, shareholders may provide that annual meetings of a corporation will not be held and its directors and officers will remain in
office until successors are elected; or that shareholders will direct
the operations of the corporation in lieu of directors. The law provides that persons assuming the discretion and powers of directors
shall bear the liability otherwise imposed by law on directors. 19 '
The law also specifically states that the existence of an agreement
authorized under section 13.1-871.1 of the Code shall not be a
ground for imposing on any shareholder personal liability for corporate acts or debts, "even if the agreement or its performance
treats the corporation as if it were a partner[s]hip ....
Shareholder agreements must be approved by all shareholders
and be either set forth in a corporation's articles of incorporation
or bylaws or contained in a written agreement executed by all
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-671.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
188. Agreements authorized by § 13.1-671.1 of the Code would become ineffective if a

corporation had more than 35 shareholders of record. Id. § 13.1-671.1(D).
189. Id. §§ 13.1-601 to -800 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
190. Id. § 13.1-671.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
191. Id. § 13.1-671.1(E).
192. Id. § 13.1-671.1(F).
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shareholders-" 3 The drafting and implementation of these agreements may suggest more considerations than are initially apparent.
For example, the payment of dividends or distributions in a manner other than in proportion to the percentage of shares held may
have undesirable tax consequences;9 or the elimination of some
routine activities of corporate governance could result in a failure
to comply with certain requirements that always remain
applicable. 9 5
A bill enacted by the 1991 General Assembly permits similar
agreements among the members or directors of nonstock
corporations. 96
C. Shareholder Voting ProceduresEnacted
Section 13.1-663 of the Code was amended in 1991 to afford
greater flexibility in the appointment of proxies. Formerly, the law
required that a proxy be appointed by means of a writing executed
by the shareholder or his authorized agent. The amendment provides that in addition, appointments shall be valid when effected
by some form of electronic transmission containing information
from which inspectors or other persons can determine that an appointment was authorized by the shareholder.1 97 The amendment
also provides that reproductions of proxy authorizations may be
used instead of originals for all purposes, provided they are complete reproductions of an entire transmission.9 "
New section 13.1-664.1 of the Code requires that large public
corporations' 9 appoint inspectors to act at shareholder meetings
and make written reports of their determinations and actions. Although inspectors have long been customary, Virginia law did not
193.

VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-671.1(B).
194. To pay dividend or distribution amounts disproportionate to the share of stock held

could be characterized as the creation of more than one class of stock and risk the loss of S
corporation status. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D)(1991).
195. For example, corporations cannot be excused from filing an annual report. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-775 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
196. Id. § 13.1-852.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
197. Id. § 13.1-663(B)(2).
198. Id. § 13.1-663(B)(3).
199. The section does not apply to corporations not having a class of voting shares that is
"(i) listed on a national securities exchange, (ii) authorized for quotation on an interdealer
quotation system of a registered national security association, or (iii) held of record by more
than 2,000 shareholders," unless a corporation not meeting any of these criteria provides in
its articles or incorporation or bylaws that the section shall apply. Id. § 13.1-664.1(E).
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previously require that they be appointed. The new law also requires that the times for opening and closing the polls for each
matter voted be announced at the meeting, and that no ballot submitted after the closing of the polls be accepted unless a circuit
court orders otherwise. 200 Finally, the new law sets forth requirements for the scope of any inspector's examination of proxies and
the reconciliation of proxies and ballots submitted by or on behalf
of brokers and other nominees when such proxies or ballots may
represent more votes than the holder of a proxy is authorized by
the record holder to cast or more votes than the shareholder holds
of record. 0 1
D.

Service of Process Provisions Consolidated

Multiple sections of the Code were amended in 1991 to set forth
unambiguously the law on substituted service of process on the
Clerk of the Commission as statutory registered agent.2 02 Until this
legislation was passed, provisions governing the substitute service
of process were scattered throughout the Code. The new law emphasizes the importance of actual notice to defendants. It requires
that the clerk keep a record of the mailing of actual notice and
that a certificate of compliance be filed in the relevant proceeding
evidencing compliance.20 3
E.

Various Stock CorporationAmendments Passed

The 1990 legislature amended section 13.1-646 of the Code to
provide that "the terms and conditions of rights, options, and warrants. . . may include. . . restrictions or conditions that preclude
or limit the exercise, transfer, or receipt thereof by designated persons or classes of persons or that invalidate or void such rights,
options, or warrants held by designated persons or classes of persons. 20 4 This amendment, which was effective immediately upon
its passage, was passed in response to a 1989 challenge to a shareholders' rights plan 2 5 based on Virginia's statutory prohibition
200. VA.CODE ANN.

§

13.1-664.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1991).

201. Id. § 13.1-664.1(D).
202. Sections 8.01-285, -299, -301, -306, -313; 13.1-517, -566, -637, -758, -766, -767, -769,

-836, -920, -928, -929, -931; § 38.2-616; and § 50-73.7 of the Code have been amended and
reenacted; and new § 12.1-19.1 has been added. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1991).
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 12.1-19.1(B)(Cum. Supp. 1991).

204. Id. § 13.1-646(B).
205. In Topper Acquisition Corp. v. Emhart Corp., No. 89-00110-R (E.D. Va. 1989)
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against discrimination among shares of the same class.2 06
Section 13.1-718 of the Code has been amended to provide that a
plan of merger or share exchange may be abandoned without action by shareholders at any time prior to the effective date of a
certificate of merger or share exchange, rather than the date of
issuance. 0 7
Section 13.1-675 of the Code has been amended to provide that
where the terms of directors are staggered, the bylaws require a
fixed number of directors and the board can amend the bylaws, the
number of directors may be increased or decreased by thirty percent or less of the number of directors of all classes immediately
following the most recent election of directors by shareholders.20 8
This is a technical clarification that eliminates an uncertainty regarding the permissible size of an increase or decrease in the case
of so-called staggered boards.
In 1990, section 13.1-695 of the Code, which governs the resignation and removal of officers of a corporation, was amended to state
that the election or appointment of an officer does not in itself create any contract rights in the officer or the corporation. This section was amended again in 1991 to provide that an officer's removal does not affect any existing contract rights of either the
officer or the corporation.20 9
Sections 6.1-194.40 and 13.1-716 of the Code have been amended
to clarify existing provisions and to permit a national bank to
merge into or consolidate with a state association or federal savings
institution whose main office is located in Virginia.2 10
A 1990 amendment to section 13.1-719 of the Code made the
short form merger statute available regardless of the direction in
which the merger is accomplished.2 1 ' Prior to adoption of this
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) the court enjoined Emhart's shareholders rights plan on
the grounds that it would treat Topper, a hostile bidder, differently from other shareholders
in violation of § 13.1-636(A). Before the litigation was concluded, Emhart agreed to be acquired by a third party.
206. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-638 (Cum. Supp. 1991) (which was also amended to accommodate this amendment to § 13.1-646 of the Code).
207. Id. § 13.1-718. Yet "written notice of abandonment must be filed with the Commission prior to the effective date of the certificate of merger or stock exchange." Id.
208. Id. § 13.1-675(B).
209. Id. § 13.1-695(B).
210. Id. § 13.1-716(B).
211. Id. § 13.1-719(A).
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amendment, the short form merger statute only permitted a
merger of a subsidiary into its parent. This amendment provides
additional flexibility in circumstances where there is a need to preserve the corporate identity of a subsidiary for example, when a
subsidiary has already fulfilled certain regulatory requirements or
obtained certain licenses.
Section 13.1-706 of the Code was amended in 1990 to provide
that a board of directors may amend the corporation's articles of
incorporation without shareholder action to eliminate or change
the par value of the shares of any class or series.212 This allows the
stated capital of a corporation to remain unchanged when a stock
split is effected.
Certain additional minor technical corrections were made that
are not included in this discussion.
F. Nonstock Corporations May Mortgage Assets Without Approval of Members
Section 13.1-900 of the Code has been amended to allow a nonstock corporation to mortgage all or substantially all of its property other than in the usual and regular course of business without
first obtaining the approval of its voting members. 21 However, approval must still be obtained in connection with sales, leases, exchanges, or other disposals under the same circumstances.
G.

CertainAmendments Made that Affect all Corporations

A number of bills passed by the 1991 legislature relate to certain
ministerial aspects of corporate governance. Section 13.1-615 of the
Code was amended to provide that any foreign corporation amending its articles of incorporation before January 1 of a given year to
reduce the number of authorized shares shall have its annual registration fee reassessed if the authenticated copy of the amendment
is filed after January 1 but within thirty days.2 14
Sections 13.1-753 and 13.1-915 of the Code have been amended
to allow for the involuntary termination of a corporation that fails
to file any document required by the Commission. 215 This amend212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 13.1-706(A).
§ 13.1-900(A) (the word "mortgage" was deleted from the section).
§ 13.1-615(B) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
§ 13.1-755(A)(iii), -915(A)(iii).
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ment will eliminate the confusion caused by duplicate names in
certain situations. For example, corporations that were terminated
and later reinstated often fail to file articles of amendment to
change their names when the names have been taken by others
during the period of termination. This amendment will enable the
Commission simply to terminate the existence of a corporation
that has failed to file the required articles of amendment.
Sections 13.1-775.1 and 13.1-936.1 of the Code have been
amended to provide for the payment of registration fees in each
year after the calendar year in which a corporation was incorporated or authorized to transact business in Virginia. 216 Previously,
registration fees were only payable by corporations authorized as
of January 1. Thus, corporations incorporating as of January 1
paid a registration fee in their initial year that was avoided by
those incorporating effective January 2.
A number of sections have been amended to permit the filing of
corporate documents not previously "required or permitted" to be
filed under either of sections 13.1-604 and 13.1-804 of the Code.217
These amendments now permit a person who has resigned as a director of a corporation or whose name is incorrectly on file with the
Commission as a director to file a statement to that effect with the
Commission, and also permit a corporation to file an amended annual report reflecting the resignation of a director and identifying
his successor. 1
Sections 13.1-752, -768, -914, and -930 have been amended to
provide for the automatic termination of a domestic corporation's
existence 219 and the automatic revocation of the certificate of authority of a foreign corporation 220 for failure to file an annual report or pay annual registration fees by September 1 of each year.
Under present law, the existence of a corporation is terminated automatically, and the certificate of authority of a foreign corporation is revoked, on June 1 of the second consecutive year after failure to file an annual report. Beginning next year, if a corporation
fails to file its annual report by April 1, it will receive notice of
impending termination or revocation in July and will be automati216. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-936.1(A), -775.1(A).
217. The sections of the Code amended are §§ 13.1-679(D), -680(E), -682(D), -695(D),
-859(D), -860(F), -862(D), and -874(D).
218. Id. § 13.1-679(D).
219. Id. §§ 13.1-752(A), -752(B)(2), -914(A), -914(B)(2).
220. Id.

§§

13.1-768(A), -768(B)(2), -930(A), -930(B)(2).
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cally terminated, or its certificate revoked, as of September 1 if its
annual report has not been received by the Commission by the
close of business on August 31.221
H. Provisions Affecting Limited Partnershipsare Adopted
Limited partnerships no longer must file documents with both
the Commission and with local circuit courts.22 2 This change parallels the elimination in 1988 of local filing requirements for corporate documents.
Section 50-37.3 of the Code has been amended to provide that a
limited partnership that has changed its name or succeeds to the
ownership of or any interest in real estate may obtain a certificate
issued by the Commission that can be filed in a local recording
office in order to maintain the continuity of title records. 223
Also, section 59.1-70 of the Code has been amended to require
that a foreign limited partnership conducting business under an
assumed or fictitious name in Virginia file a copy of its locally filed
assumed name certificate with the Commission. 224 Only domestic
limited partnerships and domestic and foreign corporations had
previously been required to do so. Finally, section 50-74 of the
of limited
Code has been amended to provide that a certificate
225
partnership may be signed by an attorney-in-fact.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Recent developments in the law affecting Virginia businesses
have been diverse. Several of the judicial decisions reviewed in this
article recognized new interpretations or applications of well-established statutory and common law. Decisions interpreting the revisions to the Virginia Stock Corporation Act made in 1985 and refined since then continue to be significant. Legislative
developments continue to provide additional alternatives to Virginia businesses.

221. Id. §§ 13.1-752(A), -752(B)(2), -768(A), -768(B)(2), -914(A), -914(B)(2), -930(A),
-930(B)(2).
222. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.5, -73.17, -73.20, and 73.67.
223. Id. § 50.1-37.3(A).
224. Id. § 59.1-70(A).
225. Id. § 50-74(a).

